How Much Do Bank Shocks Affect Investment? Evidence from Matched Bank-Firm Loan Data by Amiti, Mary & Weinstein, David E.
 Columbia University 
 
Department of Economics 










How Much Do Bank Shocks Affect Investment?  


















Department of Economics 
Columbia University 




How Much do Bank Shocks Affect Investment?
Evidence from Matched Bank-Firm Loan Data
Mary Amiti
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
David E. Weinstein
Columbia University and NBER
October 1, 2013
Abstract
We show that supply-side financial shocks have a large impact on firms’ invest-
ment. We do this by developing a new methodology to separate firm-borrowing
shocks from bank supply shocks using a vast sample of matched bank-firm lend-
ing data. We decompose loan movements in Japan for the period 1990 to 2010
into bank, firm, industry, and common shocks. The high degree of financial
institution concentration means that individual banks are large relative to the
size of the economy, which creates a role for granular shocks as in Gabaix (2011).
As a result, bank supply shocks—i.e., movements in the supply of bank loans
net of borrower characteristics and general credit conditions—can have large
impacts on aggregate loan supply and investment. We show that these bank
supply shocks explain 40 percent of aggregate loan and investment fluctuations.
___________________________
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1 Introduction
Do bank-loan supply shocks matter for investment rates, and if so, how much? Since
the principal reason firms borrow is to finance capital expenditures, this question
stands at the center of debates on the importance of financial shocks for real economic
activity. The dearth of empirical work on this issue reflects the difficulty of linking
bank supply shocks to firm investment decisions. For example, while several studies
have offered compelling bank-level evidence that bank shocks matter for loan supply
and certain types of foreign investment (cf. Peek and Rosengren (1997), Peek and
Rosengren (2000), Kashyap and Stein (2000), Klein, Peek, and Rosengren (2002),
Paravisini (2008), and Khwaja and Mian (2008)), they have not addressed the central
question of how important bank-loan supply shocks are in determining the overall
investment rates of their borrowers or aggregate investment more generally. Our
study answers this question by providing the first estimate of how much financial
institution shocks matter for overall firm-level and aggregate investment rates and
establishes that lender shocks are an important determinant of both.
We develop a new methodology that enables us to provide the first direct estimates
of firm borrowing and bank supply shocks using a comprehensive, matched lender-
borrower data set covering all loans received from all sources by every listed Japanese
firm over the period 1990 to 2010. The data contain the values of total short- and
long-term lending from hundreds of financial institutions to thousands of listed firms:
272,302 loans in total. A key difference between our approach and that of other
studies is the imposition of an adding-up constraint on the estimation that ensures
that the estimates obtained from the micro-lending data are consistent with aggregate
lending and borrowing patterns.
A major advantage of our approach relative to earlier work is that we are able
to identify the shocks directly from the loan data, and hence do not need to rely
on instrumental variables that are correlated with firm-borrowing and bank supply
shocks. These bank supply shocks measure idiosyncratic movements of loan supply
at the financial-institution level that cannot be explained by common loan shocks hit-
ting all financial institutions or even by movements in loan demand from the financial
institutions’ borrowers. Moreover, we provide extensive evidence of the external valid-
ity of our estimates. In particular, we show that our estimates capture the impact of
idiosyncratic events such as bankruptcies, capital injections, regulatory interventions,
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computer glitches, trading errors, and other proxy variables that previous researchers
have thought important determinants of Japanese bank shocks.
Armed with these bank supply shocks estimated from micro data, we then exploit
the heterogeneity in the sources of firm financing in order to identify time-varying
bank-supply shocks hitting firms. We then use these bank shocks to demonstrate that
firms that borrow heavily have investment rates that are very sensitive to their lenders’
supply shocks. Moreover, we show that these loan supply channels are important
determinants of investment not only in financial crisis years, but in non-crisis years
as well.
The fact that our micro estimates are consistent with macro data allows us to
develop a theoretically sound aggregation method that enables us to apply these esti-
mates to national accounts data. Our approach builds on Gabaix (2011) to develop a
method for estimating “granular” bank supply shocks, which measure the aggregate
loan supply movements that arise from the supply shocks of large lenders.1 We use
these granular bank shocks to measure how important the bank shocks are for under-
standing aggregate lending and investment fluctuations. In particular, we show that
granular bank shocks are both statistically and economically significant determinants
of aggregate investment, accounting for 40 percent of the fluctuations in lending and
investment.
Our work is related to a number of previous studies. One important strand of
literature is the set of papers (cf. Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), Hoshi,
Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991), and Gan (2007)) that examine the cash flow sen-
sitivity of capital-constrained and unconstrained firms. While addressing a similar
question, our methodology is quite different because we are not focused on the cash
flow sensitivity of investment but rather on whether investment rates are determined
by loan supply shocks.
A related strand of the literature has investigated the financial accelerator with
firm or industry data by examining the access to credit by borrowers that are deemed
to be more financially sensitive. For example, Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) found that
1Gabaix (2011) coined the term “granular” because it reflects the fact that firms are not in-
finitesimal in size. We use the term in the same sense here to refer to the macroeconomic impact
of idiosyncratic bank shocks. If all banks were infinitesimally small and had uncorrelated idiosyn-
cratic shocks, then these shocks would not be important for understanding aggregate fluctuations.
However, if banks are large or “granular”, idiosyncratic shocks in one or more large institutions can
move aggregate lending.
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small firms, which presumably are more constrained in their external finance options,
and bank-dependent borrowers are more sensitive to monetary policy fluctuations.
This sensitivity may reflect the financial accelerator at play, but it is also hard to rule
out other unobserved characteristics of small firms and bank-dependent borrowers
that may be driving the results.
A different strand of the literature has shown that firms or industries that depend
more heavily on external finance or lending contract more severely during bank-
ing crises (e.g., Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein (1994), Dell’Ariccia, Detragiache, and
Rajan (2008), Kalemli-Ozcan, Kamil, and Villegas-Sanchez (2010), and Chava and
Purnanandam (2011)) but has not linked the contracting sectors or firms to the af-
fected banks. Braun and Larrain (2005) have argued that sectors more dependent on
external finance are more cyclical, and that this cyclicality may be particularly man-
ifest during banking crises. Thus, it is difficult to know if there is a common factor
driving financial dependence and cyclicality. Alternatively, it may be the case that
people who invest in banks also invest in sectors that need a lot of external finance,
so that the contraction in industrial output of financially dependent sectors is only
associated with the credit contraction because investors pull back from both sectors
simultaneously.
In order to deal with the inevitable issues arising from the use of aggregate data,
several authors have worked with microdata and proxy variables for bank health to
demonstrate that bank shocks can matter for bank lending and certain types of real
economic activity. For example, the work of Peek and Rosengren (1997, 2000), Klein,
Peek, and Rosengren (2002), Khwaja and Mian (2008), Paravisini (2008), Amiti and
Weinstein (2011), Jimenez et al. (2011), Santos (2012) and Chodorow-Reich (2013)
provide bank-level or matched bank-firm level evidence that deteriorations in bank
health or increases in the cost of raising capital cause banks to contract lending,
raise rates, and/or have impacts on foreign markets or employment, but none of
these papers address whether bank-supply shocks affect the overall investment rates
of borrowers from these institutions. Thus, the question of how much these shocks
matter for investment, and therefore GDP, remains unanswered. Moreover, while the
existing literature makes use of instruments to identify the impacts of particular bank
shocks, we are able to develop a methodology that identifies these bank shocks even
in situations where it may not be possible to have measures of bank health.
Our work is also able to address a major outstanding question in the literature
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regarding whether bank shocks matter only following extreme events or for small
firms and firms without access to other sources of capital, or whether credit crunches
are a phenomenon with broader implications. For example, although Ashcraft (2005)
found that the failure of healthy bank subsidiaries affected county-level output in
Texas, Ashcraft (2006) argues that “these effects are likely to be very small and
unworthy of concern” because “while small firms might view bank loans as special,
they are not special enough for the lending channel to be an important part of how
monetary policy works.” These concerns are particularly apt given the evidence that
loans and other types of borrowing are substitutable. For example, Kashyap, Stein,
and Wilcox (1993), Kroszner, Laeven, and Klingebiel (2007), and Adrian, Colla, and
Shin (2012) show that some firms are able to substitute other forms of credit supply
in the presence of loan supply shocks, and Khwaja and Mian (2008) show that bank
shocks matter for small but not large firms. On the other hand, Hubbard, Kuttner,
and Palia (2002) stress the difficulties that firms have substituting loans from one
bank with loans from another. Consistent with both sets of studies, we find evidence
that bank supply shocks do not matter for firms that borrow little to finance their
capital expenditures. However, we also show that these bank-supply shocks affect
investment rates of those firms that borrow heavily from banks.
Finally, our paper is also related to the work of Buch and Neugebauer (2011)
and Bremus et al. (2013), who use aggregate bank loan data to construct granular
bank shocks and regress them on cross-country GDP growth. However, our work
differs from theirs in a number of respects. First, rather than ascribing bank shocks
to loan growth rate differences across institutions, which may reflect differences due
to heterogeneity in borrower characteristics across banks, our method allows us to
econometrically isolate bank shocks from firm-borrowing shocks and time-varying
common and industry shocks. This eliminates any worry that an observed correlation
between granular bank shocks and GDP might arise from large banks lending to more
procyclical sectors or any factor that would cause credit demand for large institutions
to covary more with GDP than credit demand for small institutions. Second, since
we separate firm-borrowing and bank-supply shocks, we show that the link from
the banking sector to GDP flows directly from the affected banks to the investment
decisions of their client firms. This enables us not only to be precise about the
mechanism through which GDP is affected, but also to show the relative importance
of the bank-lending channel in understanding investment fluctuations.
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops the empirical
strategy. Section 3 describes and previews the data. Section 4 provides intuition
about how our methodology generates bank shock estimates and investigates their
plausibility. Section 5 presents the main results regarding the impact of bank shocks
on firm-level investment as well as aggregate investment, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Empirical Strategy
Our econometric approach begins by specifying a fairly general empirical model that
we then can use to estimate the importance of each type of shock hitting the economy.
In order to simplify the exposition, we will refer to financial institutions in our data
as “banks” even though financial institutions in our data comprise banks, insurance
companies, and holding companies.
2.1 Estimating Firm-borrowing and Bank Shocks
Let Lfbt denote borrowing by firm f from bank b in time t. We begin by considering
a class of empirical models in which we can write the growth in lending as
Lfbt − Lfb,t−1
Lfb,t−1
= αft + βbt + εfbt, (1)
where αft is what Khwaja and Mian (2008) term the “firm-borrowing channel” and
βbt is the “bank-lending channel”. We also follow the literature and assume that the
expectation of the error term is zero, i.e. E [fbt] = 0.
This empirical model can easily be understood by contemplating the standard
explanations for what causes lending from a bank to a firm to vary. If lending varies
because of firm-level productivity shocks, changes in other factor costs, changes in
investment demand, firm-level credit constraints, etc., we will measure that as arising
from the firm borrowing channel, αft. Similarly, if a bank cuts back on lending
because it is credit constrained, we would capture that in the bank lending channel,
βbt.
While one approach to identifying these channels is to estimate equation 1 using
a large set of time-varying firm and bank fixed effects, in practice this is inefficient
because it ignores a large number of adding-up constraints. In particular, a firm
cannot borrow more without at least one bank lending more, and a bank cannot lend
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more without at least one firm borrowing more. This implies that there must be
general equilibrium linkages between the αft’s and the βbt’s. As we will see, ignoring
these linkages produces estimates of aggregate bank lending growth that are wildly
different from the actual growth rates. Such an approach to estimating equation 1
thus fails to provide an exact decomposition of actual macro lending growth into the
borrowing and lending channels.
We therefore adopt a different approach that exploits the adding-up constraints
implicit in equation 1. In order to derive the formulas for the adding-up constraints,
we multiply both sides of equation 1 by the lagged share of lending to firm f , φfb,t−1,





















and DBbt equals the growth rate of lending of bank b to all of its client firms. Crucially,
equation 2 provides the formula for the adding-up constraint linking each bank’s
loan growth, its loan supply shock and the borrowing shocks of each of it’s clients.





















and DFft equals the growth rate of borrowing of firm f from all of its banks. Equation
3 will prove to be particularly important for our analysis of the impact of bank shocks
on firm investment because the first summation term on the right-hand side captures
the impact of bank supply shocks, βbt, on the firm’s ability to borrow from banks.
Thus if we can identify the bank shocks, we will have a metric for measuring their
importance for firm borrowing.
A key methodological contribution of this paper is to show that we can ob-
tain identification of the αft’s and the βbt’s that are consistent in the sense that
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the estimates match the growth rates of firm, bank, and aggregate lending. In
particular, since φfb,t−1 is a predetermined variable, we can impose the following




= ∑f φfb,t−1E [fbt] = 0, and
E [∑b θfb,t−1fbt] = ∑b θfb,t−1E [fbt] = 0. These conditions imply that we can choose
our parameters such that the following equations hold in our data:








As we show in Appendix A, it is possible to use these moment conditions to
estimate the αft’s and βbt’s. A key insight is that equations 4 and 5 provide a system
of F + B equations and F + B unknowns in each time period enabling us to solve
for a unique set of firm and bank shocks (up to a numéraire) in each time period.
Moreover the fact that we can solve for the firm and bank shocks enables us to obtain
an exact decomposition of each bank’s aggregate lending into four terms, as described





1B + Φt−1Nt + Φt−1A˜t + B˜t, (6)





are the median firm and bank shocks in year t, which reflects any shocks
that would affect all lending pairs identically in a year; 1B and 1F are B × 1 and
F × 1 vectors of 1’s; Nt is a vector containing the median firm shock in the industry
containing the firm; Φt is a matrix that contains as elements the weights of each loan
to every borrower in time t, i.e.,
Φt ≡

φ11t . . . φF1t
... . . . ...
φ1Bt . . . φFBt
 ;
A˜t is a vector composed of each firm shock in year t less the median firm shock in
that firm’s industry in year t; and B˜t is a vector composed of each bank shock in year
t less the median bank shock in year t.2
The key feature of equation 6 is that one can exactly decompose each bank’s loan
2We could have defined the decompositions in equation 6 using the mean shock instead of the
median. However, we thought the median more appropriate because it reflects the shocks affecting
the typical bank and firm. Moreover, we also found that the average shock is more sensitive to
extreme shocks hitting small firms and banks, and we wanted to reduce the impact of these outliers.
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growth into four elements. The first term measures “common shocks”: changes in
lending that are common to all lending pairs. These shocks measure any force that
would cause all lending to rise or fall (such as an interest rate change). The second
term is the “industry shock”: a bank-specific weighted average of the industry shocks
affecting each of the bank’s borrowers. It measures changes in lending that arise
because a bank might have a loan portfolio that is skewed toward borrowers in certain
industries. The industry shock captures forces that might cause a bank’s lending
to deviate from the typical bank’s because it specialized in lending to particular
industries. We refer to the third term as the “firm-borrowing shock” or firm shock
because it captures changes in a bank’s lending that arise due to the idiosyncratic
changes in borrowing demand of their clients.
Finally, the last term captures the bank-supply shock or “bank shock” because
it measures changes in a bank’s loan supply that is independent of anything related
to the firms, industries, or common shocks hitting the economy. The elements of B˜t
equal bank b’s supply shock in year t less the supply shock of the median bank in that
year, i.e. β˜bt = βbt−B¯t. Thus, if all banks except bank b suffered a negative 10 percent
shock while bank b had no shock, that would be isomorphic in our framework to bank
b experiencing a 10 percent positive shock and all other banks experiencing no shock.
Since the supply shocks are already purged of all factors affecting their borrowers,
our measure of bank shocks reflects what is happening at each bank relative to the
typical bank.
Now that we have developed a methodology for decomposing bank lending into
firm, bank, industry and common shocks, we can turn our attention to the task
of understanding how these shocks affect aggregate lending. In order to do this,
we need a little more notation. Let wBb,t be the average share of bank b in total
lending in year t, wFf,t be the share of firm f in total borrowing in year t, and define
WB,t ≡
[
wB1t, · · · , wBBt
]
. We can now use equation 6 to obtain





It is worth pausing a moment to contemplate the implications of equation 7. This
equation decomposes aggregate loan growth, Dt, into four terms based on the firm-
borrowing and bank-lending channels. The first term captures the impact of common
shocks on aggregate lending by measuring what happens to the lending of the typical
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bank-firm pair.3 The second term represents the “granular industry shock” because it
captures the interaction between industry shocks and the size of the industries. The
size of this term will depend on the degree of aggregation used and the variance of
shocks within an industry. The third term is the “granular firm shock” because it
measures the importance of firm-borrowing shocks on aggregate lending. This term
will be small if demand shocks are small or if the loan share of every borrower tends
to be small. Finally, we refer to the last term as the “granular bank shock” because
it is a weighted average of all the financial institution shocks.
Our decomposition of aggregate lending into the four channels differs in impor-
tant ways from other studies. First, prior work on granular bank shocks has followed
Gabaix (2011) and assumed that bank supply and firm-borrowing shocks are uncor-
related across and between firms and banks. Equations 6 and 7 are more general in
that we only need to assume that these shocks are not perfectly correlated. Second,
the estimates of the bank-lending and firm-borrowing channels are consistent with
the aggregate borrowing by firms and lending by banks.
Granular bank supply shocks are likely to be particularly important for aggregate
lending fluctuations if lending markets are concentrated. The reason stems from the
fact that the magnitude of granular bank-supply shocks depends on two factors: the
variance of bank shocks (B˜t) and the existence of large financial institutions (i.e.
some of the elements of WBt are not small). As Gabaix (2011) has shown, if all
institutions were sufficiently small or if their shocks were sufficiently small, then one
should expect this term to be small because, on average, these shocks should cancel
out due to the law of large numbers. However, as we will see in the next section,
financial institutions are indeed quite large compared to the aggregate loan market
and have loan shocks that are idiosyncratic. These facts explain why we find in
our econometric section that granular bank shocks matter enormously for aggregate
fluctuations.
3As we explain in Appendix A, our methodology does not let us separate how much of the





Our data come from four sources. First, we use matched bank-firm loan data from
Nikkei NEEDS FinancialQUEST for the period 1990 to 2010. Nikkei reports all
short-term and long-term loans from each financial institution for every company on
any Japanese stock exchange, which we sum to obtain total loans. Our definition
of a “bank” covers all Japanese city, trust, regional, mutual banks, and insurance
companies, as well as Japanese holding companies. We include loans from all financial
institutions, except for the twelve that are government banks or cooperatives. We
dropped loans from government institutions such as the Development Bank of Japan
and the Export-Import Bank of Japan because we wanted to focus our results on the
impact of bank-supply shocks arising from private institutions on aggregate lending.
Our loan measure is the total borrowing from a given bank in a year, comprising all
loans received from each bank for 870 to 1,633 firms per year. Our data cover all
industries, including manufacturing, mining, agriculture, and services. We exclude
only the firms in the financial and insurance industries to avoid endogeneity concerns.
We divide the industries using the JSIC 2-digit codes, comprising 78 industries.
In general, the Japanese fiscal year runs from April in year t to March in year t+1.
More than 80 percent of the firms report annual loan data for the fiscal year ending
in March, and the rest of the firms report loans ending in one of the other months.
For most of our analysis, we will include only firms that report for the year ending
in March so that a year is defined over the same time period for all of our firms.4
We will refer to years ending in March 31 as a “fiscal year” and denote such years
by the prefix “FY” to distinguish them from calendar years. Because nine months of
any fiscal year occur in the previous calendar year, one should remember that a fiscal
year tends to refer to information that is lagged by one year relative to a calendar
year. For example, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, which failed in November 1997, fails
in FY1998 because the 1998 fiscal year closes in March 1998.
One difficulty working with these data is tracking mergers and restructurings.
Whenever a bank ceases to exist, due to either bankruptcy or merger, firms will cease
reporting that bank as a source of loans. We investigated every bank in order to
4Our results are robust to the inclusion of all months.
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see if there was any report in the media of a bankruptcy or merger. If we could not
find any report, we assumed that the zero loan data were accurate, but if we could
find evidence of a failure or a merger, we recorded the date. Since firms sometimes
reported loans coming from a restructured bank as coming from the prior institution,
we recoded these loans as coming from the restructured institution if they occurred
after the restructuring. In order to compute the loan growth of a new institution,
we had to keep track of all the institutions that predated it. Thus, if Banks 1 and
2 merged in year t to form Bank 3, Bank 3’s loans in year t − 1 would be set equal
to the sum of the loans of Banks 1 and 2, and the growth rate would be computed
accordingly. Since we could trace the evolution of hundreds of banks in our data, we
did not have any gaps associated with mergers.
A related issue concerns the definition of a bank. In general, we erred on the side
of assuming that institutions changed whenever an institution was nationalized or
privatized. For example, Long-Term Credit Bank failed in 1998 and then, after an
interval of nationalized control, reopened as Shinsei Bank in 2000, so the bank appears
in our data as different institutions for each of these periods: LTCB, “Nationalized
LTCB,” and Shinsei Bank.
To ensure sufficient observations to estimate the bank shocks, we keep only bank-
year pairs that have a minimum of five loans in both t and t − 1. This procedure
dropped 0.6 percent of the observations. The number of banks in the sample ranges
from 101 to 166 depending on the year, with a smaller number of banks in the later
period resulting from the wave of mergers in the 2000s.
The second source of data is the Development Bank of Japan (DBJ) database of
unconsolidated reports, which provides information on a wide range of firm charac-
teristics. We use information on investment, capital, total borrowings, bonds, cash,
total assets, and the firm’s book value for our analysis (while the market value is from
Nikkei). Our measure of investment is constructed as the annual difference in total
tangible fixed assets plus depreciation; and the market-to-book value is the ratio of
market value to shareholder equity.
Finally, we draw on two sources of aggregate information on economy-wide bor-
rowings and investment-to-capital ratios. The flow-of-funds data from the Bank of
Japan website provide data on the stock of lending to private nonfinancial corpora-
tions from private financial institutions.5 The economy-wide investment-to-capital
5The borrowing data are from the Bank of Japan website. The series number is
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ratio data are measured in 2000 yen for fiscal years 1990 to 2010 from the National
Accounts, Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office. The summary
statistics are reported in Appendix B.
3.2 Data Preview
In this section, we highlight some key patterns in the data. First, we show that
the pattern of aggregate lending from our firm-level data exhibits similar year-to-
year fluctuations as those from the official economy-wide statistics, demonstrating
the plausibility of using information on listed companies as a means of understanding
aggregate fluctuations. Even though lending to listed nonfinancial firms in the Nikkei
data accounts for only 17 percent of aggregate lending to nonfinancial enterprises
in 1990 and 18 percent in 2010, the aggregate lending to listed companies from our
firm-level data exhibits a similar pattern as commercial lending in the broad economy.










1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
Annual Percent Change Y/Y
Flow of Funds 
Aggregate Loans
Nikkei Loans
Note: Years are fiscal years, which roughly correspond to the calendar year plus one.
Figure 1 plots the annual percent change in loans to nonfinancial enterprises using
the flow-of-funds lending data and the annual percent change in aggregate loans to
FF’FOF_FFYS411L240.
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nonfinancial enterprises from the Nikkei firm-level database. As can be seen from this
graph, aggregate corporate loans track that of listed companies extremely closely, with
a correlation of 0.8. The figure makes clear that corporate borrowing fell off sharply as
the bubble burst in FY1990. By FY1995, the growth rate of lending became negative
and remained so for a decade.
Second, we show a clear positive association between economy-wide nonfinancial
corporate borrowing and economy-wide investment in the data. Figure 2 indicates
that the growth rate in the stock of lending to private nonfinancial corporations
from private financial institutions using the flow-of-funds data tracks the aggregate
investment-to-capital ratio fairly closely. The correlation between the two series is
0.72, illustrating the tight relationship between borrowing and investment.

















1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
Figure 7: Investment and FOF
Investment/Capital (Right Axis)
Change in ln(FOF) (Left Axis)
Note: Years are fiscal years which roughly correspond to the calendar year plus one.
Third, a critical feature of our identification strategy is the exploitation of the
fact that Japanese listed companies typically borrow from a large number of banks.
Figure 3 presents a histogram of the number of institutions providing loans to each
firm. The median firm borrowed from eight banks and 98 percent of the firms in our
sample borrowed from more than one.6 Moreover, since the average firm’s borrowing
6This is in sharp contrast with the data underlying Khwaja and Mian (2008) in which only 10
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Number of Borrowing Relationships
Hefindahl index averaged 0.17, we know that the typical firm spread its borrowing
out relatively evenly across many banks.7
Finally, we need to show sufficient “granularity” in the financial sector so it can
plausibly be argued that shocks to major banks in Japan are large enough that an
idiosyncratic shock at one of them, such as the failure of Long-Term Credit Bank,
might actually move a macroeconomic aggregate. Figure 4 shows a breakdown of
total lending by bank. For each year, we depict individual loan shares of every bank
with a loan share exceeding one percent of aggregate lending to listed companies, and
group those with a market share of less than one percent into the shaded region.
As the figure shows, Japanese finance has always been dominated by relatively few
financial institutions. In FY1990, the three largest Japanese banks accounted for 23
percent of aggregate lending to listed companies, and this number rose to 54 percent
in FY2010, with the largest financial institution, Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group
percent of the firms borrowed from more than one bank.












trated each firm’s borrowing is on average. A Herfindahl index of 1 arises if a firm only borrows
from one institution. A Herfindahl index of zero would arise if a firm spread its borrowing evenly
across an infinite number of banks.
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1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Note: Years are fiscal years, which roughly correspond to the calendar year plus one.
(MUFG), accounting for 21 percent of all Japanese lending.8 The concentration in
lending in the world’s second largest economy at the time provides the basic motiva-
tion for our suggestion that bank shocks might have macroeconomic implications. If
banks are large relative to the size of the economy, idiosyncratic shocks to particular
institutions could move macro aggregates if firms have difficulty substituting between
different sources of finance.
Interestingly, Japan’s high levels of concentration do not make the country an
outlier. For example, in the U.S., most major lenders are bank holding companies,
which in 2010 jointly accounted for 79 percent of all assets held by commercial banks,
8As Amel et al. (2004) show, the growth in merger activity in Japan’s banking and insurance
industry was quite similar to that in other industrial countries. The increase in concentration
in Japanese finance between FY2000 and FY2010 was driven by deregulating laws related to the
formation of holding companies in 1997 and, as Sakuragawa and Watanabe (2009) argue, the 2002
“Takenaka Plan,” which forced more disclosure of nonperforming loans (resulting in mergers of weak
institutions).
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thrifts, and credit unions.9 Federal Reserve data indicate that the three largest insti-
tutions in the U.S.—Bank of America, JP Morgan, and Citigroup—held 49 percent of
all banking assets.10 This number is remarkably close to the 54 percent number in our
Japanese sample. Similarly, Buch and Neugebauer (2011) calculate bank Herfindahl
indexes for many western European countries that are similar to those we obtain for
Japan. Therefore, any observed large impact from bank shocks in Japan cannot be
attributed to a more concentrated banking sector than in other countries. Rather,
the high degree of financial market concentration appears to be a feature of many
developed countries.
4 Estimating the Bank Shocks
Before turning to our main results on the impact of bank shocks on investment, we
explore in this section the unique features of our methodology and conduct some ex-
ternal validation tests of our bank shock estimates to ensure that our point estimates
are reasonable. The following three sections explore the properties of our bank shock
estimates. We first examine the efficiency gains associated with imposing the adding-
up constraints instead of using standard fixed-effects estimates. Next, we explore the
external validity of our estimates by checking that they are correlated with conven-
tional measures of bank shocks. Finally, we run some checks to make sure that the
granular bank shock term is determined by idiosyncratic bank supply movements of
large institutions.
4.1 The Importance of Adding-Up Constraints
We have argued that simply using fixed effects to estimate equation 1 is not efficient
because that procedure ignores the adding-up constraints. However, the question of
how important is this inefficiency remains. We can quantify this by first estimating
equation 1 using fixed effects in order to obtain predicted values of loan growth to
each client firm, Dˆfbt and then use these predicted values to generate estimates of
bank lending growth as follows:
9Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (2011) Annual Report 2010, March 31.
10The bank asset numbers come from the Bank Holding Company Performance Reports, which









We then can see how well the fixed effects procedure works by comparing a bank’s
actual loan growth, DBbt (obtained from equation 2) with DˆBbt.
The results from this exercise suggest that using fixed effects to identify the bank-
lending channel does not provide us with estimates that are highly correlated with
actual lending patterns. If we regress the bank’s actual loan growth, DBbt on DˆBbt, we
obtain an R2 of only 0.08. By contrast, if we implement our methodology, which
imposes the adding-up constraints given in equations 2 and 3, the R2 is one by
construction. We plot these data in Figure 5 to show that this result is not driven by a
particular institution. In other words, the inefficiency of estimating the unconstrained
fixed effects model is so severe that it hardly explains any of the aggregate bank
growth.11































Actual Bank Loan Growth
At first, this result seems puzzling: how can a model that has a full set of firm-time
11One possible reason for this result might be related to the fact that we estimate the fixed effects
model with the dependent variable in percentage changes instead of log changes. A log change
specification reduces outliers by forcing the econometrician to drop observation where loans to a
firm drop to zero. However, replacing the dependent variable with the log change in loans does not
do much to improve the fit—the R2 rises to 0.25, which still leaves most of bank lending unexplained.
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and bank-time dummies produce the conclusion that most bank lending has nothing
to do what is happening in the bank? The answer is that the standard fixed effects
structure minimizes the model’s error when fitting a typical loan, but knowing what
happened to the typical loan is not very informative about what is happening to total
bank lending. Since a major objective of this paper is to understand the bank-lending
channel and how this matters for lending aggregates, the fixed effects methodology is
not a very effective estimation technique.
4.2 Estimating Firm-Borrowing and Bank Shocks
In Figure 6, we plot the median absolute value of the estimated firm and bank shocks,
α˜ft and β˜bt, that form the elements of A˜t and B˜t in equation 6. The graph indi-
cates substantial heterogeneity in the loan supply shocks of individual banks and the
borrowing shocks experienced by firms. The figure suggests that the typical firm’s
borrowing shocks tend to fluctuate by ten to fifteen percent each year. There is an
upward trend in the volatility of the firm shocks which may reflect the fact that cap-
ital market liberalizations enabled more small firms to become listed over this time
period and these small firms may have been more volatile. Fluctuations in the bank
supply channel are typically around 8 percent each year, which is about 30 percent
smaller than the typical shock to firms.
4.3 External Validity of Bank Shock Estimates
While our methodology generates estimates that match aggregate data by construc-
tion, we also would like some reassurance that they make sense. One way to evaluate
how reasonable our estimates are is to look at their values in situations where we
have a strong prior for what they should be. We pursue this in three ways. First, we
look at extreme events. In particular, we examine the failures of financial institutions
and see what types of shocks we estimate in the last year of their existence, and we
look at extreme values and examine what happened to the institution immediately
prior to them. Second, in order to provide systematic evidence for the validity of our
bank shock estimates, we examine whether they are consistent with proxy measures
of bank shocks used in prior studies. Finally, we show that the individual bank shocks
are independent of aggregate shocks and that granular bank shocks are principally
driven by shocks to large firms. We consider each in turn.
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1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
Firm Shocks
Bank Shocks
Notes: These are the median absolute values of the firm-borrowing shocks, removing
the common and industry-specific component; and bank shocks, removing the com-
mon component, in each year. Years refer to fiscal years, which roughly correspond
to the calendar year plus one.
4.3.1 Extreme Events
We have a strong intuition that financial institutions dramatically curtail lending
when they are on the verge of failure. This result is clearly apparent in the bank-shock
measures. Financial institutions that entered bankruptcy, as opposed to merging or
receiving capital injections when financially stressed, had a mean and median bank
shock in the year of their failure of -9 percent. Some of the major institutions that
failed had even larger negative shocks. For example, we estimate Long-Term Credit
Bank (at the time, the ninth largest bank in the world) and Nippon Credit Bank had
bank shocks of -22 percent and -34 percent, respectively, in the years that they failed.
Another way of examining the plausibility of our estimates is to see what happened
in the institutions with extreme bank shocks. Obviously, there are too many bank
shocks to discuss each in detail, however, it is worthwhile examining the largest
contributors to the granular bank shock. A financial institution’s contribution to
this channel is wb,t−1β˜bt (see equation 7), which weights each bank’s shock by its
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lagged share in lending. Thus, we looked for events that preceded the ten largest
of these (in absolute value) to see if there were newsworthy events that plausibly
could have caused them. It is interesting to note that all but one of these shocks
represented lending contractions, which suggests that we should observe events that
signaled either major mismanagement or some major piece of bad news shortly before
most of the shocks. Fortunately, examples of these were easy to find.
Our estimates indicate that some of the largest bank-supply shocks to hit the
Japanese economy occurred in 2008 and were experienced by Nippon Life, Sumitomo
Life Insurance Co., Meiji Yasuda Life Insurance Co., and Dai-ichi Mutual Life In-
surance Co. The timing of these shocks hardly appears coincidental—these shocks
immediately followed the announcement of a widely reported investigation by the
Japanese Financial Services Agency (FSA) that found that these four leading insur-
ance companies had illegally denied U40 billion worth of benefits and payments in
700,000 cases.12 This scandal forced the insurers to implement what they referred to
as “drastic reforms.”13 Another insurance company, Dai-Ichi Mutual Life Insurance
in 2006, was also responsible for one of the largest shocks, which occurred follow-
ing a revelation that a computer error had resulted in the insurer failing to pay out
dividends to 47,000 policyholders between 1984 and 2005.14
Bank holding companies were also major contributors to the top ten bank shocks.
The negative shock in Japan’s largest financial group Mitsubishi-UFJ in 2005 im-
mediately followed what was a stormy merger between Japan’s second and fourth
largest banks. In the final stages of the merger negotiations, the Financial Services
Agency charged one of the merger parties with obstructing FSA inspections by con-
cealing documents that showed UFJ’s nonperforming loan situation was worse than
had been disclosed. This revelation on top of UFJ’s losses of 403 billion yen the
year before resulted in the FSA issuing UFJ four business improvement orders in the
middle of the merger.15 To make matters worse, Mitsubishi was forced to pay more
money for UFJ than it had initially anticipated because Sumitomo Mitsui Financial
Group attempted to disrupt the takeover by initiating its own hostile takeover bid.16
12The Japan Times. “Insurance Scandal Toll to Exceed U40 billion,” September 30, 2007.
13http://www.nissay.co.jp/english/news/pdf/20070919_1.pdf
14“Dai-ichi Life failed to pay 115 million yen,” The Japan Times, June 25, 2006
15Uranaka, Taiga. The Japan Times. “Misconduct, Bad Fortunes Hit: Investors Vent Spleen on
Execs at UFJ Holdings, June 26, 2004.
16Zaun, Todd. “A Bank Takeover in Japan Breaks Tradition,” The New York Times. August 25,
2004.
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Mizuho Holdings, which started out as the world’s largest bank in terms of assets,
also appears to have major idiosyncratic impacts on the supply of credit in the years
2002, 2003, and 2005.17 The events preceding these negative shocks were marked
by enormous stresses placed on the bank. In late 2001, tighter reporting standards
forced Mizuho to acknowledge twice the level of nonperforming loans that it had
earlier revealed, which contributed to a 63 percent drop in its share price.18 In 2002,
Mizuho’s share prices fell another 64 percent following a computer glitch that caused
the bank’s ATM system to collapse, rejecting millions of transactions and double-
charging some of its customers. And in early 2003, Mizuho announced, according
to The New York Times, that it was going to post “the biggest loss in Japanese
corporate history.”19 The final shock in 2005 followed one of the most spectacular
idiosyncratic errors in the history of finance: a trader at Mizuho intended to sell one
share at U610, 000 but mistyped the order and accidentally sold 610,000 shares at
U1!20
Finally, the tenth largest bank shock affecting Japan differed from the the other
shocks in that it was positive. We estimate that the magnitude of Industrial Bank of
Japan’s positive shock raised aggregate Japanese lending 1.3 percent in 1999. Once
again, this was a remarkable year for the bank following tremendous positive news for
the institution. For much of the postwar period, Japanese regulations protected long-
term credit banks from competition in the long-term lending market, but deregulation
eliminated this protected status, resulting in the failures of every long-term credit
bank except IBJ in the financial crisis of 1997–8. The troubled IBJ was only able
to survive the crisis after receiving a large capital injection in 1998. It is hardly
surprising that the year after receiving a large capital injection, the bank could once
again begin lending more aggressively.
The point of these examples is that the major bank shocks that we estimate were
typically preceded by major idiosyncratic events that could not easily be character-
ized as aggregate shocks. The results of FSA investigations into illegal activities,
17Belson, Ken. “Mizuho Holdings Projects Biggest Loss Ever in Japan,” The New York Times,
January 21, 2003.
18“World Business Briefing | Asia: Japan: Bad Loans Reportedly Rising,” The New York Times,
November 8, 2001.
19Belson, Ken. “Mizuho Holdings Projects Biggest Loss Ever in Japan,” The New York Times,
January 21, 2003.
20“Botched stock trade costs Japan firm $225M,”
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/10394551/#.Ub9VMRZ1W5Q.
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computer programming errors, capital injections, and rogue traders rocked major
Japanese financial institutions. Moreover, the fact that our estimated extreme shocks
followed these events, which really were some of the most memorable events in mod-
ern Japanese financial history, suggests that we are correctly identifying factors that
moved financial institution’s loan supply.
4.3.2 Consistency with Prior Research
This sort of validation is based on a small sample and hard to use as a general test
of validity. Fortunately, much of the existing empirical literature analyzing bank
channels is explicitly or implicitly based on the structure contained in equations 1
and 2, which lets us test whether our bank shock measures are significantly correlated
with the proxy variables used in prior studies.21 In other words, we can test whether
our bank-shock estimates are in line with their hypotheses about what moves the
bank-lending channel.
In order to see the link, we need to draw out the relationship between our frame-
work and that in some previous studies. Since the econometrician does not observe
βbt and αft, prior studies have typically identified the bank channel by identifying a
proxy variable, zbt, which is assumed to be correlated with the bank channel, βbt, but
not with αft or fbt in equation 1 in order to estimate ∆ lnLfbt = γzbt + αft + fbt




f φfb,t−1fbt. In both cases, the coefficient of in-
terest is γ = cov (zbt, βbt) /var (zbt), and authors conclude that bank shocks matter
if γ 6= 0. Although this method does not allow for the identification of βbt, existing
empirical papers tell us how much particular proxy variables (e.g., capital adequacy
ratios, market-to-book values, government credit supply, etc.) matter for lending,
but the use of proxy variables may not tell us about the many other types of bank
shocks—arising from revelations of illegal activities, good or bad management, com-
puter errors, etc.—that could also matter for lending. Nevertheless, if our identifica-
tion strategy is correct, bank shocks in our data should be correlated with the proxy
variables proposed in other studies. To put this more concretely, since we have esti-
mates of βbt and can observe the proxy variables, we can estimate γ and test whether
it has the predicted sign.
One of the most common proxy variables is the risk-based capital ratio (cf. Peek
and Rosengren (1997, 2000, 2005) and Amiti and Weinstein (2011)). These authors
21For example, Chava and Purnanandam (2011) is explicitly based on equation 1.
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argue that, in the aftermath of the bursting of the Japanese land and stock bubbles,
banks with low levels of capital adequacy were forced to cut back on lending. In other
words, these studies are based on the idea that corr (βbt, RCRbt) > 0, where RCRbt
denotes the risk-based capital ratio of a bank. Similarly, Montgomery and Shimizutani
(2009) have argued that the capital injections implemented between 1997 and 1999
should have caused bank lending to rise in recipient banks (because they had more
capital) and therefore should be positively correlated with bank shocks. In other
words, their study is based on the assumption that corr (βbt,CapitalInjectionbt) >
0. Finally, several of these studies have also argued that deteriorations in a bank’s
market-to-book value in a crisis, ∆MTBbt−1, should lead to lower bank lending, and
thus corr (βbt,∆MTBbt−1) > 0.
In Table 1, we examine each of these correlations using roughly the same time
periods as the earlier papers. It is reassuring to see that our estimated bank shocks are
correlated with proxy variables in just the way that previous authors have suggested:
risk-based capital ratios, capital injections, and changes in market-to-book values are
all positively correlated with our bank-supply shock measures. Thus, we can formally
reject the hypothesis that our estimates of movements in the bank lending channel
are uncorrelated with actual movements.
However, it is important to also realize that, while prior work was limited to tracing
out the impacts of shocks that can be tied to these proxy variables, our methodology
enables us to examine the magnitude and impacts of all bank-supply shocks.
4.3.3 Granular Bank Shocks and Aggregate Lending
One potential cause for concern about the granular bank shock is that instead of
reflecting idiosyncratic shocks experienced by large financial institutions, it may just
represent a simple correlation between large bank shocks and aggregate lending. For
example, if the lending behavior of all large institutions mimics aggregate lending, we
might think we are observing idiosyncratic shocks of large institutions—because the
large lenders differ from the small ones—but really all we are observing is the fact
that the lending behavior of a few large banks tracks aggregate lending.
We can formally test this conjecture by examining whether large bank shocks are
independent of aggregate lending movements. We do this by splitting the sample into
two groups, with one composed of data only from the banks that were among the
ten largest lenders in any year and the other comprising all of the other banks. We
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Table 1: Validation of Bank-Supply Shocks
Dependent Variable: Bank Shockb,t (1) (2) (3)




∆ ln(Market-to-Book Valueb,t- 1) 0.075**
(0.032)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 657 405 843
R2 0.037 0.030 0.012
Notes: The risk-based capital ratio in Column 1 is the combined Tier 1 and Tier 2 risk-based
capital conforming to the Basel II agreement. These data are from Peek and Rosengren (2005). In
Column 2, the regressor is a dummy variable equal to 1 if bank b received a capital injection in year
t as in Montgomery and Shimizutani (2009). In Column 3, the market-to-book value is computed
as the average of the monthly share price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding and
divided by the book value of its equity. We take the 12-month log difference of this variable. We
drop the top and bottom one percentiles for bank-supply shocks and log differences of market-
to-book value. These data were taken from Nikkei and from the Pacific Basin Capital Markets
database. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05,*p<0.1.
then regress β˜bt for each subgroup on aggregate lending growth, Dt, to see whether
aggregate loan growth provides information about what we identified as bank-supply
shocks in particular institutions. In neither subsample did we obtain a significant
coefficient, which suggests that what we term bank-supply shocks are actually un-
correlated with aggregate loan growth.22 Of course, this doesn’t mean that there is
no link between the two variables—indeed, equation 7 provides the formula for the
link—but simply that one cannot reject the hypothesis that bank shocks, themselves,
and aggregate loan movements are statistically independent, and this is true even for
the largest institutions.
22The coefficient in the regression of bank shocks on aggregate lending was -0.10 with a standard
error of 0.11 in the sample of large banks and 0.01 with a standard error of 0.08 in the sample of
smaller banks.
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It also is instructive to demonstrate that the granular bank shocks are driven by
the behavior of the largest institutions and not by the (potentially highly-correlated)
shocks of smaller lenders. We demonstrate this by first regressing a granular bank
shock computed by only including the β˜bt’s for the ten largest banks in that year on
the total granular bank shock. The slope coefficient from this regression is 0.81 (with
a standard error of 0.03), which indicates that the 10 largest banks accounted for 81
percent of the movement in the granular bank shock. Running the same regression
with a granular bank shocks computed using all banks except those in the top ten
produced a coefficient of 0.19—the coefficients must sum to one—which demonstrates
that smaller institutions account for a small role in the movement of granular bank
shocks.
5 Main Results
5.1 Bank-Supply Shocks and Firm-Level Investment
Having established the plausibility of our estimates of bank shocks, we now turn to
assessing whether these shocks matter for investment. Prior work in this area has
not had a firm-specific, time-varying measure of credit constraints and therefore has
focused on whether the cash-flow sensitivity of investment for some classes of firms
differs from that of others. As we have argued earlier, a major advantage of our
approach is that we have estimates of time-varying firm-borrowing and bank supply
changes. Moreover, equation A10 provides us with a way of decomposing each firm’s
loan growth into firm-borrowing shocks, bank-supply shocks, industry shocks, and
common shocks. The fact that not all firms borrow from all banks means that if
loans from different banks are not good substitutes, a bank-supply shock from one
bank will have a bigger impact on a firm’s investment if it is more dependent on that
bank than if it is not. To put it concretely, we use equation 5 to define the aggregate





Table 2 presents our findings. In the first column of Table 2, we estimate a
standard I/K regression on cash flow and the market-to-book value in which we also
control for firm fixed effects and year fixed effects to sweep out any factors related to
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Table 2: Firm-Level Investment
Cash Flowf,t /Capitalf,t -1 0.048*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.048***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Market-to-Book Valuef,t -1 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.012***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Bank Shockf,t -0.151*** -0.149*** -0.110**
(0.044) (0.048) (0.044)
(Bank Shockf,t )* 0.732*** 0.730*** 0.809***
     (Mean Loan-to-Asset Ratiof ) (0.192) (0.192) (0.190)
(Bank Shockf,t )* -0.040
     (Mean Bond-to-Asset Ratiof ) (0.420)
Firm Shockf,t 0.013**
(0.006)
(Firm Shockf,t )* 0.245***
     (Mean Loan-to-Asset Ratiof ) (0.038)
Industry Shockf,t 0.070*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.067***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Fixed Effects
Year yes yes yes yes yes
Firm yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 21,701 21,701 21,701 21,701 21,701
R2 0.307 0.307 0.308 0.308 0.323
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)Dependent Variable: 
Investmentf,t /Capitalf,t -1
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. We
drop the top and bottom one percentiles of each variable. The mean loan-to-asset
ratio is defined for each firm as its average ratio of loans to assets over the sample
period. The mean bond-to-asset ration is similarly defined.
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our sample of firms or correlations between firm-level investment and any common
time-varying shock to the investment rate. Not surprisingly, we find the standard
result that there is an association between a firm’s investment and its cash flow and
market-to-book value. In Column 2, we add in our industry shock variable to see if
the variation in investment-to-capital ratios of a given firm is also associated with the
typical change in firm-borrowing shocks within an industry. We find a positive and
significant coefficient on the industry-borrowing shocks, which implies that many of
the investment opportunities faced by individual firms are not economy-wide but are
specific to firms in a particular industry. These might be exchange rate movements
that affect firms in export sectors differently from those in other sectors, or any of
a host of possible variables that matter at the industry level. The most interesting
results, however, are those reported in Columns 3, 4, and 5 of Table 2, where we add
our firm and bank shock variables to the specification. Since the firms in our sample
are all listed nonfinancial firms that have access to both equity and bond markets, it
makes sense to consider the impact of a firm-borrowing or bank-supply shock as having
a different impact on a firm that borrows a lot from banks to finance its investment
relative to a firm that finances investment through other means. In other words, a
given bank shock is likely to have a much larger impact on the investment rate of a
firm that finances, say, 80 percent of its capital through bank loans than on a firm that
finances only 1 percent of its capital from loans. Therefore, in addition to including
the firm and bank shocks in the specification, we also include their interaction with
the firm’s mean loan-to-asset ratio over the sample period.23 Column 3 of Table 2
shows that the coefficient on the bank shock entering alone is negative and significant
while that on the interaction term is positive and significant, indicating that loan-
dependent firms’ investments are affected by bank shocks. Interestingly, we find that
negative bank shocks exert a positive impact on the investment of firms that do not
rely much on loans for their financing needs, which may reflect the fact that firms
that don’t rely much on loans for finance actually benefit relative to other firms when
credit conditions tighten.24
One concern about these results is that firms with access to forms of capital other
than loans may be less susceptible to bank-supply shocks. To some extent we have
23We cannot include the mean loan-to-asset ratio independently because we are already using firm
fixed effects.
24This result is a feature of the model in Buera, Fattal-Jaef, and Shin (2013).
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already corrected for this by noting that the effect of bank-supply shocks is most
keenly felt by firms that are, on average, larger borrowers. However, it might be
the case that firms that also raise a lot of financing from bond markets are less
susceptible to bank-supply shocks. In Column 4, we interact the bank shocks with
the firm’s mean bond-to-asset ratio to see if firms that rely more on bond financing
have less sensitivity to bank shocks. If this were the case, one would expect to see
a negative coefficient on the bond interaction term. The fact that we do not find a
significant coefficient on the bond interaction term suggests that the firm’s loan share
is the critical determinant of a bank shock on a firm’s investment. While access to
the bond market might serve to lower the importance of loans as a source of finance,
conditional on a given loan share of financing, we obtain equally strong estimates
of the impact of bank-supply shocks on firms with and without high levels of bond
finance.
Adding firm-borrowing shocks in Column 5 hardly affects the coefficients on the
bank shocks. The positive coefficient on the firm shock interacted with the mean
loan-to-asset ratio implies a strong association between firm-borrowing shocks and
investment for firms that are highly loan dependent, but not for firms that do not
finance much of their capital expenditures through loans. The positive association
almost surely arises because, in equilibrium, factors that raise a firm’s marginal prod-
uct of capital also raise its demand for borrowing. However, whether we control for
this factor or not does not affect the strong relationship between bank shocks and
firm-level investment.
The findings in the baseline specification in Column 5 of Table 2 imply a positive
relationship between bank shocks and investment for firms with loan-to-asset ratios
above 0.14 (around 60 percent of firms in our sample). Meanwhile, for firms below the
0.14 threshold there is either no relationship or, if anything, a negative relationship
between bank shocks and investment.
We can get some sense of the economic significance of these coefficients by con-
ducting the following exercise. A firm with a loan-to-asset ratio of 0.37 (which is in
the 75th percentile in our sample) experiencing a one standard deviation movement
in Bankshockft would see its investment-to-capital ratio move by 8.1 percent. This
suggests that even loan-dependent listed firms are quite sensitive to bank shocks.
However, this number is likely to underestimate the aggregate impact of bank lend-
ing on investment because non-listed firms are much more loan-dependent than listed
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firms (which, by definition, have access to equity markets). The average loan-to-asset
ratio in Japan over this time period was 0.48, much higher than the average for listed
firms.25 The higher loan-to-asset ratio in the Japanese economy implies that most
Japanese firms are likely to be much more sensitive to bank shocks than listed firms.
Our estimates indicate that a firm with a loan-to-asset ratio equal to that of the av-
erage Japanese firm would experience a 12 percent movement in its investment rate if
it experienced a one-standard deviation bank shock. Thus, there is reason to believe
that we should expect to see large impacts of bank shocks on investment rates as we
move to the aggregate data.
These results therefore tend to bridge the gap between studies using matched
bank-firm data and extreme events that find a strong relationship between bank
shocks and real economic activity (e.g., Klein, Peek, and Rosengren (2002), Amiti
and Weinstein (2011), Chodorow-Reich (2013)) and those that suggest firms can
circumvent these shocks by accessing bond and other markets (e.g., Adrian, Colla,
and Shin (2012)). Our results intuitively indicate that bank shocks matter for firms
that are heavily dependent on loans, but less so for firms that are not dependent on
loans. One implication of these findings is that loan-dependent firms cannot easily
substitute towards other funding sources when the banks they rely on for financing
cut back on their lending supply.
5.2 Robustness
5.2.1 Lagged Firm Shocks and Sample Periods
These results are robust to a number of alternative specifications. One concern might
be that past firm-level shocks might be driving current bank shocks. In order to
verify that this is not driving our results, in Column 1 of Table 3 we include lagged
firm shocks and find that its coefficient is close to zero and its inclusion hardly affects
the other coefficients. In Column 2, we include only the bank shock terms and the
industry effects to see if the exclusion of all potentially endogenous variables affects
the results. We find that the coefficients are almost the same.
Similarly, one might wonder if our results are driven only by crisis years. We
therefore reran our regressions excluding the major financial crisis years (FY1991,
FY1993, FY1998, and FY2009) to see if the results are robust to dropping these
25Source: http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/en/sna/data/kakuhou/files/2010/24annual_report_e.html
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Table 3: Firm-Level Investment Robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cash Flowf,t /Capitalf,t -1 0.045*** 0.044*** 0.163*** 0.043*** 0.047***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.016) (0.008) (0.006)
Market-to-Book Valuef,t -1 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.009*** 0.014*** 0.012***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Bank Shockf,t -0.112** -0.148*** -0.114** -0.130* -0.054 -0.099**
(0.046) (0.045) (0.051) (0.075) (0.062) (0.040)
(Bank Shockf,t )* 0.760*** 0.692*** 0.902*** 1.090*** 0.585** 0.629***
    (Mean Loan-to-Asset Ratiof ) (0.203) (0.192) (0.209) (0.297) (0.264) (0.170)
Firm Shockf,t 0.015** 0.019*** 0.005 0.022*** 0.014**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005)
Firm Shockf,t- 1 0.008***
(0.003)
(Firm Shockf,t )* 0.246*** 0.192*** 0.301*** 0.185*** 0.240***
     (Mean Loan-to-Asset Ratiof ) (0.041) (0.042) (0.065) (0.044) (0.038)
Industry Shockf,t 0.075*** 0.082*** 0.088*** 0.094*** 0.049** 0.063***
(0.021) (0.017) (0.021) (0.027) (0.022) (0.017)
Fixed Effects
Year yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 18,656 21,701 17,897 9,595 12,106 21,684
















Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Column (3) drops
crisis years (1991, 1993, 1998, 2009). Column (4) uses a restricted sample from 1991-2000, and
Column (5) uses a sample restricted to 2001-2010. We drop the top and bottom one percentiles
of all the variables. Column (6) uses an alternative formulation of the bank shock in which we
allow the same bank to supply credit differently to healthy and unhealthy firms. Distressed firms
are defined as in Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990) as firms with net interest payments
above operating income in years t and t-1, but not in year t-2. The results are similar if we
define distressed as just having operating income below net interest payments in the previous
year.
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years.26 The results reported in Column 3 indicate that the point estimates are
hardly affected. Finally, in Columns 4 and 5, we divide the sample into two halves
(FY1991–FY2000 and FY2001–FY2010) to see if the coefficients differ between the
early years, when bank failures were frequent, and the later years. We find that bank
shocks are significant determinants of investment in both periods, but that the point
estimates are lower (although not significantly so) in the later years. Because we
obtain our results for two non-overlapping subsamples, we can be confident that no
single event or year is driving our results. This is the first time anyone has shown that
bank-supply shocks affect firm-level investment in general and not just when there
are extreme events.
5.2.2 Differential Shocks to Healthy and Unhealthy Firms
A number of papers (e.g. Peek and Rosengren (2005) and Jimenez et al. (2011))
have found that weak banks not only lend less but lend relatively less to healthy
firms in times of trouble, a practice known as “evergreening”. Although this is not
the main focus of our paper, we can also check if our results are robust to allowing
banks to pass along their shocks more to healthy firms than to unhealthy ones. A
simple way to nest the insights of these papers into our framework is to postulate
that a bank’s supply shock differs depending on whether the client is healthy or not.
We follow Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990) in defining unhealthy firms as
previously healthy firms whose interest payments exceed their operating income for
two consecutive years.
If we split our sample according to whether the firms are healthy or not, we can
obtain different estimates of β˜bt for healthy firms and unhealthy ones. In order to keep
the notation simple, let β˜Hbt be the bank shock we obtain using loan data for healthy
firms and β˜Ubt to be the bank shock we obtain when we only include the unhealthy
firms. Define LHbt and LUbt to be bank b’s total lending to healthy and unhealthy firms,







26The first years are the same as those dropped in Amiti and Weinstein (2011) because they
correspond to the year of the initial bursting of the Japanese stock market bubble, the year when
the jusen (housing finance companies) began failing, and the year when the first major banks began
failing. The last crisis year corresponds to the first year of the more recent financial crisis.
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If we believe that evergreening causes unhealthy banks to lend more to unhealthy
firms, then we should expect that β˜Ubt > β˜Hbt when β¯bt < 0. This is, in fact, exactly
what we find in the data. The mean value of β˜Ubt − β˜Hbt for unhealthy banks is 0.058
(s.e. 0.11), indicating that troubled banks lent six percent more to unhealthy firms
than healthy firms after controlling for their loan demand.27 Interestingly, we also find
that healthy banks, i.e. those institutions with positive overall bank shocks lent 5.1
percent less to unhealthy firms (s.d. 1.2 percent), confirming the findings of Peek and
Rosengren (2005) that the provision of more credit to unhealthy firms is something
that unhealthy banks do, but healthy banks actually readjust their lending portfolios
away from their worst clients.
Of course, our main concern is not whether we can use our methodology to repli-
cate the results of other papers, but whether allowing banks to have different lending
policies for healthy and unhealthy firms affects our main result. In order to do this,
we redefined our bank shock variable to be ∑b θfbt−1β˜hbt, where h = U if the firm is
unhealthy and h = H if the firm is healthy. This enables us to allow a bank’s shock
to vary depending on both the health of the bank and the health of the borrower. We
report the result of using this regression in the last column of Table 3. The coefficient
on the bank shock terms are not significantly different than those in our main speci-
fication, which indicates that our assumption that all of a bank’s borrowers receive a
common bank shock is not driving our results.
5.3 Bank Shocks and Aggregate Lending and Investment
As already noted, a key feature of our methodology is that our bank-shock estimates
can be aggregated and applied to macro data. The lending data in our sample of
firms account for only around 17 percent of total lending in Japan in an average year.
However, our methodology allows us to identify a pure bank-supply shock that is
independent of the borrowers. If these financial institutions were all small, then they
would cancel at the aggregate level; however, as we have seen, financial institutions are
large relative to the size of even the largest countries. The starting point for thinking
about the aggregate impact is to realize that if we were to regress the left-hand side
of equation 7 on each of the right-hand side terms, we would obtain coefficients of
27Because our bank shocks were estimated off a smaller sample (especially for the unhealthy firms),
we had more outliers in our estimates. Therefore, we trimmed the top and bottom 5% of values of
β˜Ubt and β˜Hbt before computing the mean.
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one on each term since the equation is an identity.
However, this need not be the case if we replace the dependent variable with
economy-wide aggregate loan growth from the flow-of-funds data. In this case, we
can write the relationship between the percentage change in aggregate lending and







If we estimate equation 11, we will only obtain coefficients of one on each term if
each of the terms we measured using the Nikkei data equaled the terms for the whole
economy and the error term is uncorrelated with any of the explanatory variables.
Measurement error or economy-wide variables that moved more or less than the cor-
responding variables in the Nikkei data could cause the coefficients to differ from one.
Moreover, to the extent that one thought that economy-wide lending behavior and
loans to listed companies were uncorrelated, one might expect to see a low R2 from
estimating equation 11. Finally, even if we were to obtain coefficients equal to one
using flow-of-funds data, it could be the case that bank shocks are sufficiently small
that we obtain much smaller regression coefficients when executing a regression on
standardized variables because a one-standard-deviation movement in granular bank
supply might have a very small impact on aggregate lending. In other words, we can
interpret the coefficients on each of these terms as the contribution of each variable
to the flow-of-funds lending growth, while the error term corresponds to deviations
in aggregate loan growth from loan growth for listed companies. Our interest is not
in causality here, but in trying to understand how important the terms we identified
in equation 7 are in determining aggregate loan fluctuations.
In Table 4, we regress aggregate lending growth from the flow-of-funds data on
the various components of lending growth that we identified from the Nikkei matched
bank-firm data. As one can see in the first two columns of the table, aggregate lending
can only be well explained if we include the granular bank shocks. Interestingly, while
common, industry, and granular bank shocks have coefficients close to one in Column
3, the granular firm shock is attenuated, perhaps because while we have all of the
large banks in our sample, we do not have large unlisted firms, and hence there is
more measurement error in the granular firm shock variable.
Movements in aggregate lending are closely correlated with the forces we identified
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Table 4: Aggregate Effects
Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Common Shockt 0.492* 1.212*** 1.196*** 0.206** 0.475*** 1.274***
(0.261) (0.182) (0.180) (0.094) (0.113) (0.303)
Industry Shockt 0.513 1.391*** 0.595*** -0.117 0.211 0.246
(0.329) (0.275) (0.118) (0.183) (0.192) (0.223)
Firm Shockt 0.215 0.318** 0.257** -0.037 0.001 0.003
(0.145) (0.144) (0.117) (0.079) (0.060) (0.132)
Bank Shockt 1.170*** 1.042*** 0.437*** 1.057***
(0.232) (0.207) (0.124) (0.300)
Constant -0.018* -0.003 0.000 0.076*** 0.081*** 0.000
(0.009) (0.006) (0.118) (0.004) (0.004) (0.144)
Standardized Variables No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 20 20 20 20 20 20
R2 0.420 0.782 0.782 0.303 0.675 0.675
Percentage Change in Flow of Fundst Investmentt /Capitalt- 1
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. All variables,
including percentage change in the FOF and aggregate investment, are standardized in (3) and
(6) with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. The sample is for the 1991-2010 period.
in the Nikkei sample. When we include all regressors in the sample, the R2 is 0.8,
suggesting that most of what drives aggregate commercial lending is explainable by
the factors we identified in the Nikkei sample. Moreover, the coefficients on the
common shock, industry shock, and granular bank shock in Column 2 are statistically
indistinguishable from one, which is the value that would obtain if these variables had
been computed using data from all Japanese lending pairs. In other words, the data
do not reject the hypothesis that the common, industry, and granular bank shocks
identified in the Nikkei data are the same as those we would find in economy-wide
data.
However, our main interest is in understanding the importance of the granular
bank shock term. One metric of its importance is to consider how much of the variance
in aggregate lending it explains. Comparing columns 1 and 2, we see that adding the
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granular bank shock term raises the R2 of the regression by 0.36, indicating that
bank shocks account for about 40 percent of the variance in aggregate lending. The
fact that the granular bank shock term is highly significant and moves the R2 of the
regression substantially strongly suggests that the idiosyncratic lending decisions of
large financial institutions have a large impact on aggregate lending. In Column 3 of
Table 4, we run a standardized regression in order to examine the relative importance
of movements in the granular bank shock for understanding aggregate movements.
Not surprisingly, we get a coefficient indistinguishable from one on the common shock
term, indicating that a one-standard-deviation increase in lending observed in the
Nikkei data is associated with a one standard-deviation-increase in lending in Japan.
However, what is most surprising is the importance of the granular bank shock term: a
one-standard-deviation movement in this term is also associated with a one-standard-
deviation movement in aggregate lending. This indicates that aggregate loan supply
is also highly sensitive to bank shocks. In an economy composed of small financial
institutions, this term would likely be zero, but the fact that it is so large implies
that much of aggregate lending is explainable by the loan supply movements of large
institutions.
We have seen that the variation in the granular bank shock is an important com-
ponent of aggregate lending volatility. We now turn to understanding the impact of
bank shocks on aggregate investment activity in columns 4 through 6. Our results
from the previous sections have already established exogeneity of the bank shocks, a
strong relationship between firm-level investment and bank shocks, and that aggregate
lending is tightly linked to granular loan shocks. Our next question is whether these
granular bank shocks cause movements in aggregate investment. By construction,
any common shock to a firm’s investment demand will be captured in our common
shock term; therefore, the granular bank shocks cannot be caused by these common
shocks.
The granular bank shock term in Column 5 of Table 4 is strongly significant and
raises the R2 of the regression from 0.3 to 0.7, which indicates that these bank shocks
also account for 40 percent of the fluctuations in aggregate investment. In terms of
economic significance, we see in Column 6 of Table 4, where we run a standardized
regression, that a one-standard-deviation movement in the granular bank shock moves
the aggregate investment-to-capital ratio by one standard deviation—about as much
as common shocks.
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The importance of this result can be considered in comparison with those in Table
2. In that table, we learned that bank shocks matter for a firm’s investment relative
to the investment of other firms but that does not necessarily imply that these bank
shocks mattered overall. The results in Table 4 provide a way of answering the
question of whether these same bank shocks matter at the aggregate level because we
can isolate the granular bank shock from the common shocks affecting investment.
Since we control for the firm-borrowing shocks when estimating the bank shocks, the
granular bank shocks are macro variables that are not determined by fluctuations
in borrower demand. The fact that they matter so much for investment suggests
that the strong, causal link between loan supply and firm-level investment that we
identified in Tables 2 and 3 matters at the aggregate level as well.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we are the first to show that bank-supply shocks have large effects on
firm-level and aggregate investment. We do this by developing a new methodology
that enables us to estimate these effects using a fixed-effects approach that exploits
general equilibrium adding-up constraints. This new methodology increases efficiency
enormously compared to a standard fixed effect estimation by producing estimates
that can match macro aggregates, thus enabling us to not only estimate firm-level
impacts but also to identify the aggregate effects.
We estimate time-varying bank shocks, firm-borrowing shocks, industry shocks,
and common shocks using matched firm-bank loan data for Japan between 1990 and
2010. This decomposition enables us to establish a causal relationship between bank-
supply shocks and firm-level investment for those firms that are loan dependent. We
find that bank supply shocks are significant determinants of firm-level investment.
This result is particularly surprising because our sample is comprised of listed com-
panies that have, by definition, access to equity markets. Most importantly, we show
that bank-supply shocks have large effects on firm-level and economy-wide investment.
The fact that banks are large even relative to the largest economies is at the heart
of the underlying mechanism for these results. The bank data in most industrial
countries show that the distribution of banks is highly skewed with a small number of
large banks accounting for a large share of aggregate lending. For example, in Japan
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the three largest banks account for a 45 percent share of total banking assets.28
Because there is “granularity” in the banking data, the law of large numbers does not
apply, rendering firms vulnerable to the fates of individual banks. Indeed, we show
that the bank shocks account for 40 percent of the variation in Japanese aggregate
lending and 40 percent of the variation in aggregate investment.
There are a number of implications from this study. First, our results imply
that it is difficult for firms to substitute between loan sources. Although the median
number of bank loans per firm is eight in our sample, shocks to large banks still
have significant effects on these firms’ investment. Second, the fates of large financial
institutions are an important determinant of investment and real economic activity.
Although our study has relied on Japanese data, the key elements of the banking
system that underlie these results are also prevalent in other industrialized countries,
thus making it likely they would also be present in other countries. Analyzing the
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Appendix A: Derivation of Equation 6
1.1 Identifying the Bank and Firm Shocks
Because we know that the loan shares must sum to one, i.e.,∑b θfbt = 1 and∑f φfbt =
1, it must be the case that for any set of βbt’s and αft’s that satisfy equations 4 and
5, βbt + kt and αft − kt must also be a solution. This means that we need to choose
a numéraire in order to find a solution, and so we will impose that α1t = 0 (or
equivalently kt = α1t).
All shocks are defined as relative to this shock. Without loss of generality, we can
rewrite equation 5 as
DFft ≡ αft +
∑
b




θfb,t−1 (βbt − β1t) + β1t. (A1)
Similarly, we can rewrite equation 4 as








θ1b,t−1 (βbt − β1t) + β1t (A3)
or
β1t = DF1t −
∑
b 6=1
θ1b,t−1 (βbt − β1t) , (A4)
and for bank 1, we have




If we substitute equation A4 into equation A1, we obtain
DFft−DF1t = (αft − α1t)+
∑
b6=1




where θˆfbt = (θfbt − θ1bt), and βˆbt = (βbt − β1t). Substituting equation A5 into equa-
tion A2 gives us
DBbt −DB1t = (βbt − β1t) +
∑
f 6=1





where φˆfbt = (φfbt − φf1t).
For every year, equations A6 and A7 comprise a system of F+B−2 equations and
F +B−2 unknowns, where F denotes the number of firms and B denotes the number
of banks. In other words, the moment conditions uniquely determine the bank and
firm shocks up to the choice of numéraire. To see this, we use some matrix algebra.
























θˆ22t . . . θˆ2Bt
... . . . ...
θˆF2t . . . θˆFBt
 , Φˆt ≡

φˆ22t . . . φˆF2t
... . . . ...
φˆ2Bt . . . φˆFBt

We now can rewrite equation A6 as
Aˆt = DˆFt − Θˆt−1Bˆt (A8)
and equation A7 as
Bˆt = DˆBt − Φˆt−1Aˆt. (A9)
If we use this fact and insert equation A8 into equation A9, we know that any solution
to equations 5 and A9 must satisfy





This equation can be rewritten as(
IB−1 − Φˆt−1Θˆt−1
)
Bˆt = DˆBt − Φˆt−1DˆFt,
where IB−1 is a (B − 1) × (B − 1) identity matrix. We can solve for At and Bt by















We then can compute β1t according to the following formula:
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1.2 Decomposing the Shocks
We now turn to using our parameter estimates to show how we can decompose ag-
gregate lending growth into bank, firm, industry, and common shocks.
We do this by developing a method to separate the common shocks from the firm
shocks and then proceed to isolate the industry shocks. We define the common firm
shock, A¯t, as the median firm shock, and the common financial shock as the median
bank shock, B¯t. We next define the firm-borrowing shock as the difference between
the actual shocks and the median shock, i.e., A˙t ≡ At − A¯t1F , and similarly the

























θ11t . . . θ1Bt
... . . . ...
θF1t . . . θFBt
 ,Φt ≡

φ11t . . . φF1t
... . . . ...
φ1Bt . . . φFBt
 .
We can rewrite the system of equations given
DFt = At + Θt−1Bt
= A˙t + A¯t1F + Θt−1B˙t + B¯tΘt−11B





where we move from the second line to the third by making use of the fact that the
borrowing shares from each financial institution must sum to one.
Just as we can decompose firm borrowing into these three shocks, we can also
decompose bank lending into a similar set of three elements. In particular, one can
rewrite equation 4 as










We now turn to isolating the industry shocks. We define the firm shock as A˜t ≡
A˙t−medianf∈n(A˙t), where n denotes the industry the firm is in. Similarly, we define
the bank shock as B˜t ≡ B˙t −median(B˙t) = B˙t since median(B˙t) = 0. Finally, we
can define the vector of industry-level medians as Nt; then we can rewrite firm and
bank decompositions as












Appendix B: Summary Statistics
By Year Mean Median SD Minimum Maximum
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∆ ln(Market-to-Book Valueb,t- 1)  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Firm Shockf,t 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 
Industry Shockf,t   		 
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Mean Loan to Asset Ratiof 
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Mean Bond to Asset Ratiot   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
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